The purpose of this chapter is to determine the applicability of the security dilemma to ethnic tensions within Southeast Asia and the prospects of mitigating its effects. The chapter does not provide an analysis of all ethnic tensions in the region because such an undertaking would be beyond the scope of one chapter. Rather than examining each ASEAN member separately the analysis will focus on three case studies involving ethnic conflict: ethnocratic regimes; self-determination; migration. In all three case studies the focus is on the existence of the three characteristics of the security dilemma in the relations between ethnic groups, and also between ethnic groups and the regime. Is their fear of losing their identity based upon an illusory incompatibility? Is their fear a misperception based upon uncertainty of the other's intent? Are their solutions paradoxical and result in making matters worse by creating a real threat to their ethnicity? This section will then be followed with an examination of power-sharing and ethnic reconstruction to determine if these explain the apparent success of some ASEAN states in mitigating the intra-state security dilemma. However, because the security dilemma operates in a selfhelp environment, it is first necessary to determine whether the ASEAN members are weak states.
Since the security dilemma operates in a self-help environment it was noted in the previous chapter that so long as the state was weak (it lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the people), the regime, instead of being the provider of security, could become the main danger. With no guarantor for their security the ethnic groups would have to rely upon their own efforts to safeguard their security, and thus they could be considered to exist in a self-help environment. Buzan suggests that states can be plotted along a spectrum with the strongest at one end and the weakest at the other. At the extremes, states are either socially cohesive (strong) or have collapsed (weak). Examples of the latter include Lebanon, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Amongst the ASEAN members while there are no states at either extreme they all lie within the weakest half of Buzan's spectrum. Muthiah Alagappa writes, '[m] any states in the region still belong to the category of weak states. Their fragile nature (political and economic) gives rise to a range of rather complex domestic conflicts which centre on authority and legitimacy, political participation, ethnicity, religion, distributive justice and other related issues'. 1 Evidence of their weakness can be gauged from the population's perception of the state. Towards the weakest end lies a recent addition to ASEAN's membership, Burma, in which the ethnic minorities, such as the Karen separatist community, desire independence. In Indonesia and the Philippines there also exist minorities which wish either to secede (East Timor in Indonesia) or to have substantial political autonomy (Mindanao in the Philippines) and consequently they too can be considered weak.
2 In Thailand, the diffidence of the northern hill tribes towards Bangkok, the Karens on the Burma-Thai border, and the irredentist desire amongst the Patani Malay, keep Thailand weak. Even amongst the strongest states in ASEAN, Malaysia and Singapore, evidence can be garnered to highlight their weakness. In these cases it is not so much the people's perception of the state that provides the evidence, but rather the actions of the ruling regime. In Malaysia, because the regime is aware that issues can give rise to ethnic tension which could pose a serious threat to state security, state leaders often highlight the need for careful policy implementation. Such warnings would not be needed in a strong state. An example of this occurred in July 1997 with the implementation of Islamic law and the conviction of three Muslim beauty contestants in Selangor. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Anwar Ibrahim, stated that 'in a multi-faceted society we must be careful in implementing [Islamic] law' and he stressed that if it is done in a forceful manner it would result in unrest and revolt by the people. In Singapore, evidence of the state's weakness is likewise found from state leaders; although because Singapore is the strongest ASEAN member such evidence usually only surfaces during election time when racial issues might be used for political gain. This was particularly evident in the 1997 election with the hounding of opposition candidate Tang Liang Hong, whom PAP leaders accused of 'threatening the delicate harmony between the island's Chinese, Malay and Indian communities '. 4 Given that the PAP could not lose this election it seems odd
